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INSIDE CAMPAIGN FINANCE: MYTHS AND REALmES. By Frank J.
Sorauf. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1992. Pp. x, 274. $30.

Reform-oriented commentators have labeled Frank Sorauf's 1 contributions to the campaign finance debate "anti-reform writing."2
This description implies that Sorauf sides either with those satisfied
with the campaign-finance-system status quo 3 or with free-market
zealots who seek to dismantle the entire campaign finance regulatory
system.4 In reality, Sorauffalls within neither of these camps. Rather,
he merely finds the dysfunctions of the present system less serious than
reformers portray them and, accordingly, favors solutions less radical
than those that most reformers propose. The reformers' misleading
characterization of Sorauf may reveal less about his work than it does
about their own prickliness toward anyone not adhering to their
Chicken-Little outlook on the political world. 5
· A more intriguing question than how to categorize Sorauf's writing is why he has chosen to revisit a topic that he covered comprehensively only four years earlier· in Money in American Elections. 6 The
germ of an answer may lie in his more recent book's full title: Inside
Campaign Finance: Myths and Realities. As the book progresses, it
becomes increasingly clear that the "myths" Sorauf refers to are the
characterizations of the American political system that reformers have
made and that politicians and the mass media have faithfully parroted;
the "realities" are those that Sorauf and other political scientists have
exposed and that the general public has largely ignored. Inside Campaign Finance is not so much about reforming the campaign finance
system as it is about reforming the reformers.
After a brief explanation of the history of campaign finance and
the legal framework established by the Federal Election Campaign
1. Professor of Political Science, University of Minnesota.
2. See, e.g., Daniel H. Lowenstein, On Campaign Finance Refonn: The Root of All Evil ls
Deeply Rooted, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 301, 329 (1989).

3. See, e.g., Frank J. Fahrenkopf, The Campaign Finance System Isn't Sick, WASH. POST,
Apr. 30, 1987, at A19.
4. See, e.g., Gerald G. Ashdown, Buying Speech: Campaign Spending, the New Politics, and
Election Law Refonn, 23 NEW ENG. L. REv. 397 (1988); Sam Kazman, Purer Politics, Greasier
Pigs, and Other Wonders of Campaign Refonn, REGULATION, Summer 1992, at 62.
5. Reformers tend to describe the present state of campaign finance in only the most catastrophic terms. See, e.g., BROOKS JACKSON, HONEST GRAFT: BIG MONEY AND THE AMERICAN PoLmCAL PROCESS 295 (1988) ("America is becoming a special-interest nation where
money is displacing votes."); PHILIP M. STERN, THE BEST CoNGRESS MONEY CAN Buy 194-99
(1988); Lowenstein, supra note 1, at 366 ("Our campaign finance system is corrupt and its-poison
is a serious blight on American government ..••").
6. FRANK J. SORAUF, MONEY IN AMERICAN ELECTIONS (1988).

1865

1866

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 92:1865

Act (FECA)7 and the Supreme Court's ruling in Buckley v. Valeo, 8
Sorauf sets the stage for the conflict between "myth" and "reality."
Reform positions, he explains, are rooted in a progressive world view
that both distrusts political money and sees it as the underlying cause
of most political events (p. 24). According to Sorauf, this view "has
come to dominate the American debate over campaign finance" (p.
24), so much so that "the most singular aspect of the debate ... is its
one-sidedness" (p. 23). The reformers' hegemony, he complains, "has
created a separate epistemology of campaign finance ... based on its
own rules of evidence and grounded in the premise of the monetary
root of all evil. "9
Central to the ascendance of the reform perspective on campaign
finance, according to Sorauf, is an unholy alliance between reformers
and the national news media. The inherent advantage of the progressive view is that it "fits the imperatives of contemporary journalism,"
namely, finding simplistic, morally tinged, and easily recounted stories
to feed to impatient audiences (p. 24). Reformers' portrayals of the
campaign finance system as thoroughly corrupted by monetary influence meet these criteria, however inaccurate those depictions may be.
On the other hand, "[t]here is little room - and little consumer tolerance - for the hedges and caveats, the uncertainties and complexities,
of the academic accounts" that Sorauf and his colleagues offer (p. 25).
Consequently, the media communicates the reform message, casually
describing campaign accounts as "war chests," PACs as "special-interest representatives," and campaign contributions as "sewer money"
(p. 26).
Sorauf explains that there are profound differences between political scientists' outlook on campaign finance issues and the reform
mantra. In contrast to academic researchers, who view campaign finance as a subject of "endless complexity, of ambiguous causes, and of
shared and dispersed influence," reformers' portrayals are "of dominant actors and great events, of clear and dramatic causes, a mesmerizing pageant of power and corruption" (p. 26). The propagation of
these "Progressive-populist myths" (p. 163), Sorauf says, creates a
Plato's cave effect, obscuring the complex realities of campaign finance
7. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified as
amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-456 (1988)).
8. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). In Buckley, the Court held that FECA provisions imposing mandatory
expenditure limits on congressional campaigns, restricting independent expenditures to $1000
per year, and limiting the amount of personal wealth that candidates could expend on their own
campaigns violated the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 424 U.S. at 39-54. As Sorauf
notes, this ruling left the FECA "a tattered remnant of its original self," and effectively spawned
a hybrid legislative-judicial campaign finance system. P. 12. Sorauf has elsewhere criticized the
Court's rationale in Buckley. See Frank J. Sorauf, Caught in a Political Thicket: The Supreme
Court and Campaign Finance, 3 CONST. COMMENTARY 97 (1986).
9. P. 23. This view is clearly reflected in Lowenstein, supra note 2, at 301-02.
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and compelling citizens "to watch the shadows projected on the vast
wall in front of them ... [in a] dance of distorted images" (p. 189).
The reform movement attacks our present campaign finance system on three basic grounds. First, the reform movement asserts that
dependence on private "special interest" funding results in pervasive
corruption of the political system. 10 One reform commentator representing this view claims that "under our present system of campaign
finance, politicians and interest groups engage routinely ... in felonious bribery that goes unprosecuted primarily because the crime is so
pervasive." 11 Second, reformers complain that the campaign finance
system creates powerful proincumbent biases in the electoral process
that defeat democratic choice. 12 Finally, reformers allege that the system makes political campaigns too expensive, creating barriers to entry for potential candidates and causing fundraising to consume
inordinate amounts of candidates' and politicians' time. 13
Sorauf addresses these criticisms of the current system, but does
not condemn them as baseless or imaginary. Instead Sorauf argues
that in each case the criticisms are either exaggerated or mistakenly
regarded as resulting from monetary influences. Sorauf first targets
the "myth" that campaign contributions effectively purchase legislative votes. He mocks the presumption that "all transactions in campaign finance are bribes" and forms of "'legalized corruption.' " 14
Such characterizations are convenient, according to Sorauf, because
"there are no hard distinctions to make, no need to separate the positive from the negative, the useful from the destructive" (p. 162). The
first fallacy in the bribery comparison, he says, is that it portrays a
unilateral market, with the contributors as aggressive buyers of influence and candidates as passive, even reluctant sellers (p. 60). In reality, the exchange is bilateral and occurs in a market with a variety of
prices, terms, and options for both buyer and seller (pp. 63-64).
Sorauf points out that under a bilateral conception of the political
marketplace, candidates' behavior and strategies can influence contributors just as easily as campaign contributors can influence politicians'
legislative behavior (pp. 64-65).
Viewing the campaign finance market as bilateral therefore diminishes the significance of the correlations between campaign contribu10. See, e.g., JACKSON, supra note 5, at 294-95; STERN, supra note 5, at 182-83.
11. Daniel H. Lowenstein, Political Bribery and the Intennediate Theory of Politics, 32
UCLA L. REv. 784, 848 (1985).
12. See, e.g., STERN, supra note 5, at 35-37; Paul D. Wellstone, True Election Refonn,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 22, 1993, at 18.
13. See, e.g., LARRY MAKINSON, THE CASH CoNSTITUENTS OF CONGRESS 2 (1992); STERN,
supra note 5, at 37, 99-100, 197-98; Michael Tackett & Christopher Drew, "The best Congress
that money can buy," CHI. TRIB., Dec. 7, 1992, § 1, at 1, 8.
14. Pp. 162-63 (citing Lowenstein, supra note 10, at 848, and AMITAI ETZIONI, CAPITAL
CoRRUPTION: THE NEW ATTACK ON AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 56-57 (1984)).
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tions and voting behavior that reformers frequently display as
evidence of the corruption pervading our political system. ts To
Sorauf, such correlations are unsurprising: "Contributors contribute
to like-minded candidates, just as voters vote for like-minded candidates" (p. 165). The real question is which variable is independent and
which is dependent, or in Sorauf's terms, "[d]oes the money follow the
votes, or do the votes follow the money?" (p. 165). Sorauf suggests
that the answer is a little of both, but that the cause-effect ambiguity
confounds any clear interpretation of reformers' correlative evidence.
Furthermore, he cites academic studies finding the views of even important campaign contributors to have little actual influence on legislative voting behavior.1 6 He postulates that contributors are only
influential when more important influences such as constituency opinion or party position are not pronounced, and in the sort of policy
refinements crafted in legislative committees (p. 170). Sorauf concludes: "Contributors do not necessarily seek, or even expect, to score
impressive policy victories measured by final roll-call votes. . . . [For
them], the smaller accomplishments have to suffice" (p. 170).
Sorauf portrays conventional wisdom about the campaign finance
system's role in securing incumbents' electoral advantages as similarly
misguided. The reform position, as he describes it, is that
"[i]ncumbents win so often because they outspend their opponents so
greatly, and challengers fail to win because they lack the resources
with which to mount a winning campaign" (p. 175). Sorauf believes
that this logic suffers from the same cause-effect dilemma as do reformers' assumptions about the relationship between campaign finance
and legislative behavior. The important question, he says, is: "Do
candidates win because they spend more money, or do they get more
money, and spend it, because they are likely to win?" (p. 175).
Sorauf answers that the progressive-populist "money is the root of
all evil" presumption is even less supportable in the electoral context
than in the legislative context. He points out that high incumbent reelection rates predate the campaign finance system installed by FECA
15. See, e.g., ELIZABETH DREW, PoLmCS AND MONEY 81-87 (1983); STERN, supra note 5,
at 43-54.
16. Pp. 166-67 (citing Janet M. Grenzke, PACs and the Congressional Supermarket: The
Currency Is Complex, 33 AM. J. PoL. SCI. 1 (1989); W.P. Welch, Campaign Contributions and
Legislative Voting: Milk Money and Dairy Price Supports, 35 W. POL. Q. 478 (1982); and John
R. Wright, PACs, Contributions, and Roll Calls: An Organizational Perspective, 79 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 400, 411 (1985)); see also JOHN w. KINGDON, CoNGRESSMEN'S VOTING DECISIONS 14648 (3d ed. 1989) (finding interest-group position to be a weak predictor of voting behavior and
finding opinions of constituencies and congressional colleagues to be much stronger predictors of
congressional voting behavior than interest-group position); SORAUF, supra note 6, at 316
(describing PAC contributions as having "at most a modest influence •.. far less important than
the voting constituency, the party or the values [of] the legislator"). But see Lowenstein, supra
note 2, at 313-17 (criticizing the methodology and conclusions of the Grenzke and Wright
studies).
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in the l 970s. 17 Sorauf suggests that incumbency reelection rates are
largely propelled by advantages of office that are entirely unrelated to
campaign finance, such as the postal frank, media access, district offices, and government-paid staffs (p. 175). Sorauf also discusses research showing an inverse relationship between incumbent spending
and incumbent electoral success. Thus, contrary to conventional wisdom, the more incumbents spend, the worse they do. 18
Sorauf does not conclude, as do the reformers, that incumbents'
reelection rates are so high because they can raise more money.
Sorauf argues instead that incumbents can raise more money because
their chances of reelection are so strong. Campaign contributors seeking to curry legislative favor do not count on their money to buy elections; they simply recognize that because money cannot offset
incumbents' electoral advantages, supporting challengers is a futile exercise (pp. 67-70). Hence, "the greatest advantage the incumbents
have is not their campaign money; it is the expectation early in the
election cycle that they can and will win reelection" (p. 178).
Sorauf then turns his attention to the final set of reform criticisms:
that campaign spending has become excessive and needs to be curtailed. He does not view this complaint as baseless, acknowledging
several negative practical consequences of the upward spiral in expenditures: consumption of candidates' time, increased prominence of
money brokers, and heightened b~ers to entry for potential candidates.19 But as a judgment about the value of campaigns, Sorauf feels
that it reflects "a double standard, one code of behavior for the private
sector and another for the public sector" (p. 187). He notes that campaign expenditures are dwarfeel by: advertising budgets of large corporations, comparing the $445.2 million spent on congressional
campaigns in 1990 to Sears, Roebuck's $1.4 billion advertismg tab for
the same year (p. 187). Campaigiis, Sorauf insists, are simply expensive; a $600,000 campaign budget for a House race provides funds for
only two direct mailings and three television advertisements, an effort
that is "something less than profligate" (pp. 188-89). Given this,
Sorauf sees "a plausible argument that candidates spend too little, not
too much, in congressional campaigns."20
Reformers emphasize public funding of campaigns and enhanced
restrictions on campaign finance as the exclusive solutions to what
they see as the deepening quagmire of corruption caused by our cur17. Pp. 70, 175. Even statistics cited in reform literature show that Senate reelection rates
dipped after FECA's passage and House reelection rates are only slightly higher than in the preWatergate era. See MAKlNSON, supra note 13, at 5.
18. Pp. 176-78 (discussing GARY c. JACOBSON, MONEY IN CoNGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS
(1980)).
19. Pp. 187-88. 6n this point, at least, Soraufis'in substantial agreement with the reformers.
See, e.g., STERN, supra note 5, at 37, 99-122; Tackett & Drew, supra note 13, at 8.
20. P. 189; see also Ashdown, supra note 4, at 417-20.
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rent system.21 Prominently featured in such proposals are capping
campaign spending, banning campaign contributions from organized
interests such as P ACs and from out-of-state or out-of-district contributors, and providing substantial public subsidies for political campaigns. Essentially, the reformers seek to flush as much private,
interested money out of the campaign finance system as possible, replacing it with a massive transfusion of untainted public funds.
Unsurprisingly, Sorauf rejects both the need for such major surgery and the efficacy of reformers' solutions. He calls banning PAC
contributions "probably the worst reform idea of the post-1974 regime" (p. 199). Such a move would not only be unjustified, according
to the author, but ultimately counterproductive. Sorauf argues that
banning PAC contributions would increase the leverage of other contributors, disadvantage candidates from the inner city, and obscure the
sources of contributions, all without significantly stemming the flow of
interested money. 22 He regards spending limits as similarly flawed because they will increase the electoral system's incumbent bias and because large contributors can easily evade them (pp. 214-15). Sorauf
also ridicules reformers' efforts to fund campaigns with public money
as both politically unviable2 3 and hopelessly naive (pp. 218-21), comparing the assumption that "one can find enough innocent, purposeless money'' to "the stork theory of human reproduction" (p. 221).
Reformers' goals, he declares, constitute "a search to find again a
golden age of simpler, grass-roots, citizenly politics ... [that] never
existed except in our nostalgic longings" (p. 221).
The chasm between these academic "realities" about contributor
influence and popular perceptions about contributors' roles in the
political system is attributable to several factors, Sorauf explains.
First, participants in the campaign finance system, especially the contributors themselves, tend to overplay the importance of financial interests in the legislative process (p. 171). Sorauf cites notorious
campaign donor Charles Keating as symbolic of this tendency (p.
171). The misperception also stems from the power of anecdotal evidence to obscure empirical reality. Reformers and the media, Sorauf
says, focus "on the limited, often dramatic event" that is "chosen to
show a relationship, not because [it is] representative of the full universe of PAC-incumbent exchanges" (p. 165). Finally, the public be21. See, e.g., JACKSON, supra note 5, at 301-12; STERN, supra note 5 at 180-84; Wellstone,
supra note 12, at 18.
22. Pp. 199-201. A host of generally reform-oriented commentators and groups have recently echoed these concerns. See James A. Barnes, Sticky Wicket, 25 NATL. J. 1108, 1109
(1993); Sharon Berry, Will Curbing PACs Hurt Black Reps?, BLACK ENTERPRISE, Sept. 1993, at
25; Larry J. Sabata, Bad Reform Ideas That Sound Good, CAMPAIGNS & ELECTIONS, Apr.-May
1993, at 25.
23. Cf. Barnes, supra note 22, at 1110, 1112 (detailing political and public opposition to
public funding).
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lieves inferences of widespread political corruption because our
political culture's progre8sive-populist values regarding the corrosive
influence of money render them inherently credible. "The line between dispositions to believe and foregone conclusions," Sorauf comments, "is very thin" (p. 171).
Sorauf's critique of the contemporary political reform movement is
convincing to the extent that it exposes reformers' claims about the
evils of campaign finance as hyperbolic and even somewhat demagogic. He utilizes the voluminous statistics that twenty years of
mandatory public disclosure of candidates' campaign finance data
have produced24 in a manner that is forceful, yet not manipulative.
Perhaps the book's greatest strength is that it strives to paint a complete picture of campaign finance issues and thereby avoids leaving the
reader thirsting to hear the story's other side. Among a literature
abundant with one-sided diatribes, rhetorical excesses, and questionable conclusions, Sorauf's work stands as a thorough and carefully reasoned analysis of the effects of the election law reforms instituted in
Watergate's aftermath.
Yet Sorauf's statistical analysis cannot completely explain away
the problems associated with our campaign finance system. Political
corruption and tainted elections are not worrisome only in the aggregate; they are antithetical to fundamental notions of democracy and
therefore deeply disturbing whenever they occur. The evidence that
such phenomena are present at least to some extent in the American
political system is overwhelming and their existence is confirmed by
politicians of all stripes. 25 To argue, as Sorauf seems to, that such
incidents should be ignored because they are insufficiently widespread
is akin to arguing that because the percentage of Americans who are
murdered each year is tiny, homicide is not a serious social problem.
Even if Inside Campaign Finance does not prove that the malfunctions of the campaign finance system should go unaddressed, it exposes a significant and alarming rift between the system's reformers
and the academic experts. Sorauf represents a legion of leading academics who dissent both from reformers' diagnoses of the maladies of
our campaign finance system and from their proposed cures. 26 It appears, though, that the reformers, not Sorauf and his cohorts, are the
ones shaping policy. Both the campaign finance reform bill that the
24. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-434 (1988).
25. See STERN, supra note 5, at 99-122; Lowenstein, supra note 2, at 331-34 (discussing statements of Rep. Matsui); Tackett & Drew, supra note 13, at 1 (discussing statement of Rep. Synar).
26. See, e.g., Gary C. Jacobson, Campaign Finance and Democratic Control: Comments on
Gottlieb and Lowenstein's Papers, 18 HOFSTRA L. R.Ev. 369 (1989); Herbert E. Alexander, Hidden Costs of Campaign Reform, STATE GOVT. NEWS, Apr. 1990, at 16; Curtis Gans, ••. And
PAC-ing It In: Why Congress Hasn't Broken the Impasse - and How It Can, WASH. POST, Dec.
6, 1992, at CS; Sabato, supra note 22.
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Senate passed in 1993 27 and the House's 1993 bil1 28 revolve around
spending limits, public funding, and a drastic reduction in the role of
private contributors - all remedies that Sorauf and other academic
experts regard as unnecessary and counterproductive. This disjunction between expert opinion and legislative product suggests that the
current round of campaign finance reforms will be no more successful
at rooting out corruption and electoral bias than its predecessor of the
Watergate era. Thus the rift between political scientists and the reform movement presents potentially serious repercussions.
Unfortunately, Inside Campaign Finance is unlikely to make
Sorauf's message more audible above the din of reform rhetoric.
Deiise with statistics and primarily discursive in tone, its message buried in back pages, the book is truly an academic work. Certainly,
there is nothing wrong with academic writing per se, but when an issue is on the political front burners, as campaign finance presently is,
and one's opponents are as articulate and media-savvy as campaign
finance reformers have proved themselves to be,29 an academic tome is
undoubtedly an inopportune forum. It is regrettable that a specious
newspaper editorial can have more impact than a thoroughly
researched and analytically cogent book like Inside Campaign Finance. However, it is difficult to see how academics can engineer the
triumph of their "realities" over the reform movement's "myths" and
thereby influence the next wave of campaign finance reforms while remaining ensconced in their ivory towers.
- Michael R. Phillips

27. S. 3, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
28. H.R. 3, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). The House bill differs from the Senate's plan in
several material respects, and the bills had not been reconciled before adjournment of the first
session.
29. One important reason for the reform movement's ability to communicate its message
effectively through the media is that many leading reformers are members of the media them·
selves. Prominent examples include Elizabeth Drew, who writes for the New Yorker, and Brooks
Jackson, a member of the Wall Street Journal staff.

